

Wireless Protocol Validation Under Uncertainty

Jinghao Shi, Shuvendu K. Lahiri*, Ranveer Chandra*, Geoffrey Challen

University at Buffalo, NY, USA

*Microsoft Research Redmond, WA, USA



Customized Wireless Protocols Are Everywhere



Proprietary Protocol



New Functionality

By extending existing Protocol



Special Requirements

Latency

Power consumption

...

Industry Wireless Design/Implementation Flow


Protocol Designers

Microsoft, Apple, Google...

1. Design protocol using simulation
- Qualnet, NS-3,...



3. How to validate the **implementation** meets the **spec**?




- Proprietary implementation
- Resource limitation
- “Heisenberg” effect

Wireless Chip Vendors


Qualcomm, MTK...



2. Low level **proprietary** implementation




Wireless Sniffer as Observer




Trace: Pkt_1 Pkt_2 Pkt_3 ...

Wireless Communication Properties

Packet loss



Physical Diversity





α_1 and α_2 are **independent**

Two Sources of Sniffer Trace Uncertainty

Sniffer *misses* Pkt (seen by DUT).

Sniffer *overhears* Pkt (not seen by DUT).



DUT Trace:

... Pkt ...





Sniffer Trace:

... Pkt ...

... Pkt ...

... Pkt ...



An Example Protocol: Packet Transmission



P_i : packet with seq num i
 P_i' : retransmission of P_i

False Alarms

Transmitter (DUT)



Root Cause

Sniffer and DUT may see different traces

Sniffer may either:

- Miss packets that are present in DUT's trace
- Overhear extra packet that not in DUT's trace

Can not directly use sniffer trace for validation


False alarms may occur

Key Idea



Relax the original state machine with
non-deterministic transitions

- Avoid raising false alarms, while...
- Still capture true violations

Augmented Transitions






Original State Machine S
Deterministic



Augmented State Machine S^+
Non-Deterministic

Augmented State Machine




Original State Machine S
Deterministic

Augmented State Machine S^+
Non-Deterministic


Eliminating False Alarms

$S_0 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow \dots$




Sniffer overhears Ack

$S_0 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow \dots$






Sniffer misses P_0




Augmented State Machine S^+
Non-Deterministic

The Problem: Does S accept Tr_{DUT} ?



Original State Machine S
 DUT Trace: Tr_{DUT}




Augmented State Machine S^+
 Sniffer Trace: $Tr_{sniffer}$

Relationship of Tr_{DUT} and $Tr_{sniffer}$

Packets overheard by sniffer

Packets missed by sniffer




p.dest == DUT

Sniffer can not overhear packets that are not sent by DUT

Mutation Trace

- Definition: Mutation Trace
 - A packet trace Tr' is a **mutation** of sniffer trace $Tr_{sniffer}$ w.r.t a DUT if for all $(t, p) \in Tr_{sniffer} / Tr'$, $p.dest = DUT$.
- Lemma: $Tr_{DUT} \in M(Tr_{sniffer})$ (Set of mutation traces of $Tr_{sniffer}$)




Satisfiability Theorem

S^+ accepts $Tr_{sniffer}$ iff. $\exists Tr' \in M(Tr_{sniffer})$ that S accepts Tr'

- Lemma
If S^+ rejects $Tr_{sniffer}$, then S rejects Tr_{DUT}
- S^+ accepts $Tr_{sniffer} \not\Rightarrow S$ accepts Tr_{DUT} .
 - Fundamental limitation of sniffer trace

Instance of (Likely) Violation



Sniffer Trace

... P_0 Ack P_{100} ...

200 ϵ transitions




Relaxed too much...

Pruning Heuristics

- Goal:
 - Constraint augmented transitions to report true violations
 - Make runtime practical
- *NumMissing*(d, k, l)
 - For device d , number of missing packets (Type-1) of and subtrace of length l must not exceed k
- *GoBack*(k)
 - Backtrace up to k packets

Evaluation on NS-3

Experiment Setup



Evaluation Metrics

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\{\text{Reported Bugs}\} \cap \{\text{True Bugs}\}}{\{\text{Reported Bugs}\}}$$

Accuracy

Higher precision,
Less false positive.


$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\{\text{Reported Bugs}\} \cap \{\text{True Bugs}\}}{\{\text{True Bugs}\}}$$

Completeness

Higher recall,
Less false negative.


Results

Heuristics: $NumMissing(d, k, 100)$ (fixed $l = 100$), GoBack(7)



More tolerant to sniffer loss,
Less false positive.

No False Positive



No False Negative

Real-World Application

- Found 3 latent bugs in the development phase of Xbox One wireless controller
- Being actively used by Xbox accessory testing team (since 08/2015)

Ongoing/Future Works

Wireless Validation Framework

